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Abstract: Correlations of inflation with the growth rate of money increase when data are averaged over 
longer time periods. Correlations of inflation with the growth of money also are higher when high-inflation 
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averaging increases the correlation of inflation and money growth more when the underlying inflation rate 
has higher serial correlation.  
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Is inﬂation related to money growth? Many have interpreted recent low corre-
lations of money growth and inﬂation as evidence that inﬂation is not related
to money growth under all circumstances, perhaps especially in low-inﬂation
environments.
T h e r ei sal a r g el i t e r a t u r es h o w i n gt h a tm o n e yg r o w t ha n di n ﬂation are re-
lated. The earliest papers in modern times were associated with the Money
and Banking workshop at the University of Chicago (Friedman 1956). While
Anderson and Jordan’s (1968) paper using quarterly data for the United States
was controversial, it clearly showed that money and inﬂation were related for
1952 to 1968. More recent papers suggest that such a relationship is not as
c l o s eo ra si n f o r m a t i v es i n c et h ed e c l i n ei ni n ﬂation in the U.S. in the 1980s.
Kishor and Kochin (2007) show that part if not all of the explanation for
the change in the importance of money growth in the United States is the
change in the importance attached to inﬂation in monetary policy. When
the monetary authority targets inﬂation using a control variable, the simple
relationship between inﬂation and the control variable will decline because
the control variable is changing to oﬀset other inﬂuences on inﬂation. Kishor
and Kochin show that the evidence for the United States is quite consistent
with this analysis and an increasing emphasis on stabilizing inﬂa t i o ni nU . S .
monetary policy.
Empirical results across countries are not unequivocal either. Lucas (1980),
Lothian (1985), Dwyer and Hafer (1988, 1999), McCandless and Weber (1995),
Rolnick and Weber (1997) and others ﬁnd substantial correlations of money
growth and inﬂation across countries for diﬀerent time periods. Moroney
(2002) and De Grauwe and Polan (2005) examine a common criticism of such
analyses, namely that the correlations are driven by the high inﬂation coun-
tries and there is little relationship between money growth and inﬂation for low
inﬂation countries. Moroney (2002) selects countries based on money growth
rates and ﬁnds a positive relationship between money growth and inﬂation in
low-money-growth countries, but the relationship is stronger and more strik-
ing when countries with higher money growth are included in the analysis. De
Grauwe and Polan present evidence that the correlations are close to zero or
zero for low inﬂation countries. Frain (2004), responding to the 2001 working-
paper version of De Grauwe and Polan’s paper, removes countries with visible,
documented data discontinuites or less than 25 years of data. He ﬁnds non-
zero correlations of inﬂa t i o na n dm o n e yg r o w t hr e l a t i v et or e a li n c o m eg r o w t h
for low inﬂation countries as well as high inﬂation countries. He also ﬁnds
regression coeﬃcients for low inﬂation countries that are not diﬀerent than
1one at the ﬁve percent signiﬁcance level. 1 Lothian and McCarthy (2009) pro-
ceed in a diﬀerent way, comparing diﬀerences in growth rates across periods
with evident diﬀerences in inﬂation. Even though the mean inﬂation rate in
the high-inﬂation regime is less than ten percent, they ﬁnd a close connection
b e t w e e nt h ei n c r e a s ei ni n ﬂation to these low levels and an increase in the the
growth of money relative to real income.
The length of time over which growth rates are computed has an important
inﬂuence on the analysis as well. Dwyer and Hafer (1988, 1999) show that the
relationship across countries is not particularly obvious over periods as short
as a year and is unambiguous over ﬁve-year periods. McCandless and Weber
(1995) use data over 30 year periods to analyze the relationship and ﬁnd clear
relationships. De Grauwe and Polan (2005) ﬁnd a relationship when using all
countries over a 30-year period as does Frain (2004) for a 25-year period. While
interesting and possibly informative, if the only reliable relationship between
money growth and inﬂation is over a quarter of century, that certainly is very
long run.
2 S o m eE v i d e n c eo nM o n e yG r o w t ha n dI n ﬂation
Before proceeding to our analysis, we document the results discussed above,
including the importance of averaging over time and the implications of using
only low money-growth countries. First, there is a noticeably closer relation-
ship between inﬂation and money growth over longer periods than shorter
periods. This is at least as strong a characteristic of the data as the other ob-
servation: countries with relatively high money growth show this relationship
more clearly and make a substantial contribution to the apparent relationship
across countries. We also summarize some empirical results about coeﬃcients
in regressions of inﬂa t i o no nm o n e yg r o w t h .
Throughout this paper, we measure the nominal quantity of money and its
growth rate relative to real income. Adjusting the nominal quantity of money
in this manner is useful if the income elasticity of the demand for money is
unity or not too far from unity. While this is not a particularly important
adjustment when there is substantial variation in inﬂation relative to real
income growth, it is more important when inﬂation variation is on the order
of magnitude of the variation in inﬂation.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
1 The standard errors are larger for low-inﬂation countries, but conﬁdence intervals
include one and do not include zero.
2The price level and money relative to real income are strikingly similar for both
of the two high inﬂa t i o nc o u n t r i e ss h o w ni nF i g u r e1 ,B r a z i lf r o m1 9 1 2t o2 0 0 6
and Chile from 1940 to 2006. The price level is the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) deﬂator. The measure of money is the nominal quantity of money
divided by real GDP. All of the series are set to have average values of 100 for
the time periods covered. The vertical axis is a proportional scale, making it
possible to read growth rates from the slopes of the lines. The closeness of the
behavior of the price level and money in both graphs, including the decreases
in inﬂation toward the end of the periods, is striking.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 shows similar graphs for two countries with relatively low inﬂation,
Japan and the United States for the parts of the postwar period with consistent
data. The movements of the price level and money relative to real income are
similar, but deﬁnitely not as close as in the graphs for Brazil and Chile. As
earlier papers indicate, there is little obvious short-term relationship. In the
United States, money relative to income is low compared to the price level in
the 1990s. The fall in the price level in Japan from 1998 to 2006 is associated
with lower growth of money relative to income for those years, but there is no
corresponding fall in the level of money relative to income. Money relative to
income increases 0.8 percent per year from 1998 to 2006 while prices fall 1.3
percent per year.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3 shows average inﬂation rates and growth rates of money relative to
real income across countries. As does Frain (2004), we use the term “excess
money growth” instead of the more cumbersome “growth of money relative
to real income”. The upper left panel shows the relationship between the two
for all 166 countries for which we have data for twelve or more consecutive
years. We include data starting in 1985 or later through the end of the period.
Not all of the countries have data for the whole period, for example Albania’s
data begin in 1994. The upper right panel shows the relationship for countries
with an excess money growth rate less than 50 percent, 159 of the countries.
The lower left panel shows the relationship for countries with excess money
growth less than 20 percent, and the lower right panel shows the relationship
for countries with excess money growth less than 10 percent. We use the
growth of money relative to real income instead of the inﬂation rate to pick
countries with low inﬂation because regressions of inﬂa t i o no nm o n e yg r o w t h
have biased coeﬃcients if countries are picked on the basis of the dependent
variable, the inﬂation rate. 2
2 Suppose that inﬂation and the growth of money relative to real income are related
with a coeﬃcient of one and money growth is exogenous to inﬂation. If inﬂation is
used to pick countries, then the dependent variable is being used to select the
3For all of the countries, there is a positive relationship between inﬂation and
excess money growth. We ﬁnd a positive relationship for low inﬂation countries
which we deﬁne as those with excess money growth less than ten percent
per year. The correlation monotonically decrease with decreases in the cutoﬀ
growth of excess money but it does not go to zero. The correlation is 0.47 even
for countries with the average growth of excess money less than ten percent.
Figure 3 also shows lines for regressions of inﬂation on excess money growth.
The slopes in these regressions also are used by some as a criteria for evaluating
the usefulness of money as a predictor of inﬂation, with coeﬃcients close to one
being considered more supportive (Moroney, 2002; Frain, 2004; DeGrauwe and
Polan, 2005). As the data are cut oﬀ at lower growth rates of excess money, the
regression coeﬃcients decrease, with the regression coeﬃcients in this ﬁgure
decreasing from 1.01 for all the data, to 0.99 for countries with excess money
growth less than 50 percent, to 0.88 for countries with excess money growth
less than 20 percent and to 0.41 for countries with excess money growth less
than 10 percent.
The regression coeﬃcient is substantially less than unity for lower growth rates
of excess money. Kisher and Kochin’s (2007) analysis suggests why this is so.
The correlation of inﬂation and excess money growth is zero if all deviations
from a constant target inﬂation rate are unpredictable. The fall in the cor-
relation and the regression coeﬃcient is consistent with their analysis if low
inﬂation countries have less variability of inﬂation targets and therefore less
correlation of inﬂation and excess money growth.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Figure 4 shows the relationship between inﬂation and money growth when
the data are averaged over successively shorter periods. The upper left panel
shows the relationship over all the years for which we have data on each
country, which is as much as 21 years and as few as twelve years. The upper
right panel shows the relationship with data averaged over the last ten years
for which we have data. The lower panels show the relationship with data
averaged over ﬁve years and one year. It is clear that the relationship becomes
weaker over shorter periods. This is consistent with averages presented over
ﬁve years and less presented by Dwyer and Hafer (1988, 1999).
Figure 4 also shows regression coeﬃcients of inﬂation on excess money growth.
These coeﬃcients also decrease as the data are averaged over shorter periods,
observations. Countries with inﬂation greater than 10 percent and growth of money
relative to real income less than 10 percent are excluded but countries with inﬂation
less than 10 percent and growth of money relative to real income greater than 10
percent are included. This selection biases the regression coeﬃcient downward from
one.
4from 1.01 for all the data to 0.46 for one year of data.
3M o n e y G r o w t h a n d I n ﬂation
Why are money growth and inﬂation more closely related when data are av-
eraged over long time periods and when high inﬂation countries are included
in an analysis of inﬂation and money growth? In this section, we provide an
explanation based on variation of the underlying inﬂation rate relative to the
demand for money. This analysis predicts that higher serial correlation of the
underlying inﬂation rate is associated with a larger increase in the correla-
tion between inﬂa t i o na n dm o n e yg r o w t ha sm o r ey e a r sa r ea v e r a g e d .W e
also show that the size of the slope coeﬃcient in a regression of inﬂation on
money growth is uninformative about whether the quantity theory holds. The
quantity theory is consistent with a slope coeﬃcient of unity in a regression
of inﬂa t i o no nm o n e yg r o w t ha n di ti sc o n s i s t e n tw i t has l o p ec o e ﬃcient less
than unity.
Suppose that the demand for money has unit income elasticity and no other
variables systematically aﬀect demand. Then
μt − yt = πt + εt (1)
where μt is the growth rate of the nominal quantity of money in period t, πt is
the inﬂation rate, yt i st h eg r o w t hr a t eo fr e a li n c o m ea n dεt is an error term
in the demand for money.
3.1 Inﬂation Targeting
Suppose that the monetary authority’s actions target the inﬂation rate, whether
this is intentional or not, and the target is π∗
t which varies over time. This re-
lationship can be written
πt = π
∗
t + ηt, (2)
where ηt is the error term in this equation. For simplicity, we suppress the
subscript t. Combining (1) and (2) results in
μ − y = π + ε = π
∗ + η + ε. (3)
The correlation of the inﬂation rate (2) and excess money growth (3) is
ρ = Corr[π,μ− y]=
Cov[π∗ + η,π∗ + η + ε]




Var [π∗ + η]+Cov[ε,π∗ + η]
SD[π∗ + η](Var [π∗ + η]+2 Cov[ε,π∗ + η]+Var [ε])
1/2. (5)
At ﬁrst glance, it is not obvious this is particularly helpful. Suppose, though,
that the error term in the demand for money is orthogonal to the target price
level and errors in hitting it, i.e. Cov[ε,π∗ + η]=0 . Then the correlation of
the inﬂation rate and excess money growth simpliﬁes to
ρ =
SD[π∗ + η]
(Var [π∗ + η]+Var [ε])
1/2. (6)
This equation for the correlation can be interpreted in an informative way.
First oﬀ, suppose that the variance of the inﬂation target and errors in hitting
it are zero. Equation (6) states the obvious: the correlation of the inﬂation rate
with excess money growth is zero. If there is substantial variance in inﬂation
targets or errors in generating that inﬂation rate relative to the demand for
money, then the correlation will be closer to one. This is related to the analysis
by Kishor and Kochin (2007); it also provides a tenative explanation of Figure
3. For countries with similar inﬂation targets, i.e. little variance of inﬂation
targets or errors in hitting them, the correlation across countries of inﬂation
with excess money growth will be low if not zero. At the other end of the
range between zero and one, zero variance of the error term in the growth of
money demand implies
Corr[π,μ− y]=1 . (7)
The demand for money and the monetary authority’s inﬂation target may
well have diﬀerent characteristics over time. Suppose that the inﬂation target
varies gradually over time and the demand for money varies more over short
periods of time. Then the relative variance of π∗+η and ε will change as data
are averaged over diﬀerent time periods. Over short periods, the variance of
the demand for money will be larger relative to the variance in the supply;
over longer periods, the variance of the demand for money decreases relative
to the variance in the supply. In the limit, the variance in demand goes to
zero and the correlation of the inﬂation rate with excess money growth goes
to one.
Orthogonality of the error term in the demand for money and the error in the
supply of money and changes in the target inﬂation rate is suﬃcient for this




(1 + 2Cov[ε,π]/Var [π]+Var [ε]/Var [π])
1/2. (8)
6Even if Cov[ε,π] 6=0 , this correlation approaches one as Var[π] increases
relative to Cov[ε,π] and Var[ε]. In short, a higher correlation of inﬂation and
excess money growth is to be expected with a higher variance of the inﬂation
target and errors hitting it if the covariance of errors in the growth of money
demand with the inﬂa t i o nr a t ea n dt h ev a r i a n c ei ne r r o r si nt h ed e m a n df o r
money do not increase proportionately.
The regression coeﬃcient from a regression of inﬂa t i o no ne x c e s sm o n e yg r o w t h




Var [μ − y]
, (9)
which can be rewritten as
βπ|μ−y =
Var [π]
Var [π]+2 Cov[ε,π]+Var [ε]
+
Cov[π,ε]
Var [π]+2 Cov[ε,π]+Var [ε]
. (10)






which is less than one unless Var[ε] is zero. 3 Stated more positively, βπ|μ−y
approaches one as Var[ε]/Var [π] goes to zero but, with inﬂation targeting, the
coeﬃcient does not equal one even if the covariance of errors in the growth of
money demand and the inﬂation rate is zero. This result does not hold under
all circumstances.
3.2 Control of Money Supply
Instead of being determined by the demand for money as it would be under
inﬂation targeting, suppose the supply of money is determined by
μ = π
∗ + y + ζ, (12)
where ζ is the error term and the demand for money is the same as equation
(1). The money supply is determined with a target inﬂation rate as the goal
but the growth rate of the nominal quantity of money is changed to eﬀect the
3 The similarity of this formula and the one for regressions with errors in the
right-hand-side variables is not an accident. With inﬂation targeting, shocks to
the demand for money aﬀect the growth of the nominal quantity of money but not
the inﬂation rate. This is similar to measurement error in a right-hand-side variable
that has no eﬀect on a left-hand-side variable.
7goal. The growth rate of real income is included in the equation for the supply
of money with a coeﬃcient of one to reﬂect the growth of demand due to real
income. The central bank can achieve its target inﬂation rate by changing the
growth rate of the nominal quantity of money with the growth rate of real
income. This equation (12) can be rewritten
μ − y = π
∗ + ζ. (13)
Equating the growth of the demand for the nominal quantity of money (1)
and the supply of the nominal quantity of money (13) yields
π = π
∗ + ζ − ε. (14)
It follows that the correlation of the inﬂation rate and excess money growth
ρm is
ρm =
1 − Cov[ε,π∗ + ζ]/Var [π∗ + ζ]
(1 − 2Cov[π∗ + ζ,ε]/Var [π∗ + ζ]+Var [ε]/Var [π∗ + ζ])
1/2. (15)
If Cov[ε,π∗ + ζ]=0 ,t h e n
ρm =
SD[π∗ + ζ]
(Var [π∗ + ζ]+Var [ε])
1/2 =
1
(1 + Var [ε]/Var [π∗ + ζ])
1/2 (16)
which approaches one as Var[ε]/Var [π∗ + ζ] goes to one. This is the same
conclusion as above under inﬂation targeting.
The conclusion concerning regression coeﬃcients does change though. The





Var [μ − y]
=
Var [π∗ + ζ] − Cov[ε,π∗ + ζ]
Var [π∗ + ζ]
=1−
Cov[ε,π∗ + ζ]
Var [π∗ + ζ]
.
(17)
If Cov[ε,π∗ + ζ]=0 ,t h e nβ
∗
π|μ−y =1 . This is not true if Cov[ε,π∗ + ζ] 6=0 ,
although β
∗
π|μ−y approaches one as Cov[ε,π∗ + ζ]/Var [π∗ + ζ] goes to zero.
In sum, if the covariance of the errors in the demand for money and supply of
money is zero, the correlation of inﬂation and excess money growth increases
to one as the variance in the demand for money goes to zero relative to the
t h ev a r i a n c ei nt h es u p p l yf o rm o n e y .T h i s conclusion concerning the correla-
tion’s value holds whether the monetary regime is one of inﬂation targeting or
control of the money supply. The coeﬃcient in a regression of inﬂa t i o no nt h e
excess money growth rate depends on how the nominal quantity of money is
determined.
84 Persistence in the Underlying Inﬂation Rate
In this section, we derive testable predictions concerning the evolution of the
underlying inﬂation rate and the correlation of excess money growth and in-
ﬂation. We show that serial correlation of the underlying inﬂation rate is con-
sistent with increases in the correlation of inﬂation and excess money growth
as data are averaged over longer periods, and higher serial correlation is con-
sistent with a greater increase in the correlation.
Consistent with the argument above, suppose that errors in the demand for
money are serially uncorrelated but suppose that the underlying inﬂation rate,




−1 + ν, (18)






0. If Cov[ε,π]=0 , the earlier analysis show that the one-period correlation





Let π2 =( π + π−1)/2 and ε2 =( ε + ε−1)/2. Given these deﬁnitions, the















Given serially uncorrelated errors that are mutually uncorrelated, Cov[π,π−1]=




Var [π]+βVar [π∗]+Var [ε]
#1/2
. (22)
T h ei s s u ei sw h e t h e r
ρ2 R ρ. (23)







9S i n c et h i si sp o s i t i v eb ya s s u m p t i o n ,i tf o l l o w st h a t
ρ2 >ρ 1. (25)





Var[π] increases. The parameter β represents the serial correlation in
the underlying inﬂation rate. Increases in β increase the diﬀerence between
the one-period and two-period correlations. If β =0 , then ρ2 = ρ1. If β>0,
then ρ2 >ρ 1. The other terms represent the product of the variation in the
inﬂation target relative to the inﬂation rate and the variation in the demand
for money relative to the inﬂation rate, which aﬀect the magnitude of the
increase in the correlation.
5T h e G e n e r a l i z e d L o c a l L e v e l M o d e l
We can examine the relationship between the correlations and the serial cor-
relation of the underlying inﬂation rate π∗ in a state-space model in which
π∗ is unobservable. We use a Bayesian analysis to derive the posterior distri-
bution of the serial correlation parameter β and the relationship between β
and the correlation between inﬂation and excess money growth as the data
are averaged over longer periods.
The generalized local level model is a simple state-space model involving an
observation (measurement) equation and a state (transition) equation. 4 We
have T observations on inﬂation π =( π1,...,π T). The state variable is the
underlying inﬂation rate π∗ =( π∗
1,...,π ∗
T) which is not directly observed. The
observation and state equations are (for t =1 ,...,T)
πt = π
∗
t + ηt (26)
π
∗
t = δ(1 − β)+βπ
∗


















⎦.( 2 8 )
We impose the restriction −1 <β≤ 1. The local level model itself as in Koop
(2003) is characterized by β =1 .
It is important to deal with the unobserved observation in period 0 in a clean
way. Let π∗
0 = δ+w,w h e r ew ∼ N(0,h −1λ) and w is independent of the other
4 This model is a generalization of the local level model given in Koop (2003). The
generalization allows the unobserved state variable to be stationary.
10disturbances. Eliminating π∗




1 = δ + βw+ u1. (29)
Consequently, we see that π∗
1 ∼ N(δ,h−1 (β
2λ+ψ)). (Note that if β =0 ,t h e n
λ does not appear in the distribution for π∗
1.)
Given this setup, we now show that π follows a restricted ARMA(1,1) for





δ + βw+ u1 + η1 t =1
δ(1 − β)+βπ t−1 + ut + ηt − βη t−1 t ≥ 2.
(30)
Note E0[w]=E0[ut]=E0[ηt]=0 . Therefore, E0[πt]=δ for all t ≥ 1.D e ﬁne
ωt := ut + ηt − βη t−1.L e tγω(τ) denote the autocovariance function for ω.
Then γω(0) = ψh −1 +(1+β
2)h−1, γω(1) = −βh −1,a n dγω(τ)=0for τ ≥ 2.
This autocovariance function is characteristic of an MA(1). As such, we can
reexpress ωt as ωt = vt − ξv t−1,w h e r e|ξ| < 1. 5 We see that π is a restricted
ARMA(1,1) for t ≥ 2.I fβ =1 ,t h e nπ is an IMA(1,1).






φ := (δ,β,λ,ψ). (32)
The factorization on the right-hand side of (31) will prove convenient. The











5 According to this parameterization of ω, γω(0) = (1 + ξ2)σ2




1+β2 + ψ −
q




1+β2 + ψ +
q
(1 + β2 + ψ)2 − 4β2
2h
.
Thus the local level model imposes a restriction between ξ and β.C o n s e q u e n t l y
not all ARMA(1,1) processes can be expressed as a generalized local level model.
Moreover, β 6= ξ as long as β =0 . Therefore the problem of local non-identiﬁcation
due to cancelation of common factors is absent.
11The observation and state equations provide p(π|π∗,h) and p(π∗|h,φ) respec-
tively. To complete the model we must specify the priors p(h|φ) and p(φ).W e
defer consideration of p(φ) u n t i ll a t e r .L e tt h ep r i o rf o rh be independent of
φ: p(h|φ)=p(h),w i t hp(h) given by the Gamma distribution: 6
h ∼ G(s
−2,ν). (34)
This prior for h delivers analytical expressions for the conditional posterior
p(π∗,h|π,φ) and for the marginal likelihood p(π|φ).
In order to derive the aforementioned analytical expressions for the conditional
posterior and marginal likelihood, it is convenient to change the parametriza-
tion. As a preliminary, stack the observation equations as follows:
π = π
∗ + η. (35)
Using π∗ = Wθ, we can write (35) as













T − βπ ∗
T−1
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
(37)






i−j i ≥ j
0 otherwise.
(38)
(Note |W| =1 .) As long as we condition on φ,w ec a nt r e a tβ–and hence
W–as known. The advantage of the new parametrization appears in the state-
6 We adopt the parametrization of the Gamma distribution given by Koop (2003,






























δ + βw+ u1 t =1
δ(1 − β)+ut t>1.
(39)
The distributions for π and θ implied by (36) and (39) are



































Equation (36) can be interpreted as a normal linear regression model for which
(40b) and (34) form a natural conjugate prior:
(θ,h)|φ ∼ NG(θ,V,s
−2,ν). (42)
Given the conjugacy of the prior (42) with respect to the likelihood (40a), the
posterior inherits the form of the prior; namely,

















ν = ν + T (46)
ν s




























where π∗ = Wθ and V π∗ = WVW>. Thus we have established the posterior
distribution for π∗ and h conditional on φ:
(π
∗,h) | (π,φ) ∼ NG(π
∗,V π∗,s
−2,ν). (49)
7 See Koop (2003, p. 187).
13We now turn to the posterior for φ. The marginal posterior for φ can be
expressed as
p(φ|π) ∝ p(π|φ)p(φ). (50)



















(Note c is free of φ.) The ﬁrst equality in (51) is identically true while the sec-
ond equality follows from the speciﬁc functional forms given in (34) and (40).
The parameter space for φ =( δ,β,λ,ψ) is
Φ =( −∞,∞) × (−1,1] × (0,∞) × (0,∞). (53)






In addition, values for (s2,ν) must be speciﬁed. We adopt a noninformative
prior, setting ν =0and setting s2 to an arbitrary value (since s2 enters the
posterior only via the product ν s2).
We can make draws of φ from p(φ|π) via the symmetric random-walk Metropo-
lis MCMC algorithm. The algorithm produces a sequence of draws {φ
(r)}R
r=1
.G i v e nφ
(r) one computes φ
(r+1) as follows: Draw φ
0 ∼ N(φ
(r),Ω) and u ∼












Equation (55) shows that if the proposal φ
0 is “uphill” from the current point
φ
(r) in the sense that p(φ
0|π) ≥ p(φ
(r)|π),t h e ni ti sa l w a y sa c c e p t e d( i . e . ,a d d e d
to the output sequence); by contrast, if the proposal is “downhill” from the
current point, then it is accepted with a probability that is proportional to the
likelihood ratio. (If the proposal is out of bounds, i.e. if φ
0 6∈ Φ,t h e np(φ
0|π)=0
and the proposal is never accepted.) Note that if the proposal is not accepted,
then the current point φ
(r) is placed again in the output sequence, which
(among other things) induces serial correlation in the sequence of draws. To
make the algorithm operational, one chooses a starting value φ
(0) ∈ Φ and the
8 See Koop (2003, p. 189)
14covariance matrix Ω. (The covariance matrix provides a scale for the random-
walk step size.) One must also specify the number of burn-in draws to discard
and the amount of thinning to do (if any) after the burn-in period. 9
6 Our Estimates
We have a dataset with 166 countries, each of which has continuous annual
data for twelve or more years. The number of observations on inﬂation in each
country ranges from twelve to 21. While it would be even better to compare
across monetary regimes within a country, the paucity of observations implied
by such a strategy leads us to examine the data across countries.
6.1 Estimates of the Serial Correlation
Let φi denote the parameters for the i-th country. The parameter of interest
is {βi}.W em a k ed r a w so fφi from p(φi|πi) via the symmetric random-walk
Metropolis MCMC algorithm. For each country we make two runs, using the
results of the ﬁrst to calibrate the second. For the ﬁrst run, we adopt a starting
value of φ
(0)
i =( 0 ,.5,1,1) and we use Ω = diag(10−4,10−2,10−2,10−2) as the
covariance matrix for the scale of the step size. We make 104 burn-in draws and
then make 105 draws, keeping every one in 102. Next we compute the mean
and covariance of the 103 draws produced by the ﬁrst run. For the second run,
we set φ
(0)
i to the computed mean (from the ﬁr s tr u n )a n dw es e tΩ to .2 times
the computed covariance matrix. We make 104 burn-in draws for the second
run and then make 105 draws, keeping every one in 102. This produces a total
of 103 draws for each country to approximate the posterior distribution of
φi. The draws are not independent and the average ﬁrst-order autocorrelation
across all parameters and all countries is .13. There are only four countries
for which the maximum autocorrelation for any of the four parameters in φi
is above .5. An approximation for the eﬀective number of independent draws
is given by




where R is the number of draws and ρ is the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation. In
our case R =1 0 3.F o rβ, e n averages about 790 and is not less than 340.
The posterior means and the 90% highest posterior density regions for βi are
shown in Figure 5. The point estimates for all but 12 countries are positive
and the regions do not include zero for 96 of the 166 countries.
9 Koop (2003, Section 5.5) provides a detailed summary of the Metropolis MCMC.
15[Insert Figure 5 about here]
6.2 Relation to Correlations
We are interested in the relation across countries between the posterior means
of the autoregressive coeﬃcients and the correlations of the inﬂation rate and
the growth rate of exces money. Let βi denote the posterior mean of βi and ρis
denote the sample correlation between the inﬂa t i o nr a t ea n dt h ee x c e s sm o n e y
growth rate for country i over s periods. We summarize the relationship by
the correlation between β =( β1,...,βn) and ρs =( ρ1s,...,ρns) by the simple
correlation rs.
Figure 6 shows scatterplots for ρis versus βi for s ∈ {1,3,5}.T h et o pr o w
shows plots for all 166 countries, while the bottom row shows plots for only
those 119 countries for which we have at least 20 observations. Twenty obser-
vations would be considered a small sample for estimating a serial correlation
coeﬃcient in most contexts, but requiring 20 observations eliminates over a
quarter of these countries.
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
To estimate the posterior distribution of rs, we apply the Bayesian bootstrap
to rs, producing {r(m)
s }M
m=1. The Bayesian bootstrap works as follows. Make a
draw w(m) from the ﬂat Dirichlet distribution and compute r(m)










































































Figure 7 shows the estimated posterior distributions of the correlations be-
tween the serial correlation coeﬃcients and the correlations of inﬂation and
money growth diﬀerent time spans. All of the rs are positive, indicating that
the posterior means of the serial correlation coeﬃcients and the correlation of
money growth and inﬂation clearly are positive.
[Insert Figure 7 about here]













1 . The results are shown in Figure 8. We ﬁnd the
fraction of d
(m)
3 that is positive is about .91 while the fraction of d
(m)
5 that is
positive is about .66. If we use only countries that have at least 20 observations,
then the fractions increase to about .99 and .93, respectively.
These distributions are evidence in favor of the proposition that an increase
in the serial correlation coeﬃcient leads to an increase in the correlation of
money growth and inﬂation.
[Insert Figure 8 about here]
7C o n c l u s i o n
The relationship between inﬂation and excess money growth still is controver-
sial. We ﬁnd a positive correlation across all countries. The correlation falls as
countries with higher excess money growth are excluded, but the correlation
is 0.47 across countries with excess money growth of ten percent or less. We
show that the lower correlation for low inﬂation countries is not surprising if
low inﬂation countries have lower variation in unpredictable changes in the
supply of money relative to unpredictable changes in the demand for money.
We also show that the size of a regression coeﬃcient of inﬂa t i o no ne x c e s s
money growth is uninformative about the quantity theory. If errors in the
supply of money are uncorrelated with errors in the demand for money, then
a regression of inﬂation on the growth rate of money will have a slope coeﬃent
of unity. On the other hand, if this correlation is not zero, as it is with explicit
or implicit inﬂation targeting, the nominal quanity of money is endogenous
and a regression of inﬂation on money growth will not deliver a coeﬃcient
of unity. This is perfectly consistent with the quantity theory holding. While
regression coeﬃcients equal to unity may seem like a plausible way to evaluate
the quantity theory, the quantity theory is consistent with coeﬃcients less than
o n ea sw e l la se q u a lt oo n e .
Higher correlations between money growth and inﬂation when data are aver-
aged over time is consistent with this same analysis. We show that positive
serial correlation of the underlying inﬂation rate is consistent with higher
correlations of excess money growth with inﬂation as the growth rates are
computed over longer time periods. We also show that monetary regimes with
more sustained deviations of inﬂation from its mean will show greater increases
in the correlation of excess money growth and inﬂation as the growth rates
are computed over longer time periods.
17We then test these implications. We ﬁnd substantial variation in serial cor-
relation of underlying inﬂation rates and we ﬁnd this variation is positively
related to the increase in correlations as data are averaged over longer periods.
Our results indicate that sustained excess money growth is positively corre-
lated with inﬂation. The greater apparence of that relationship when data are
averaged over time and when countries with sustained deviations of inﬂation
from its mean inﬂation are quite consistent with the quantity theory holding.
188 Data Appendix
We analyze annual data for the United States and for 182 countries. The
data across countries include available data for 1985 and subsequent years.
These data are from the World Development Indicators website, the March
2008 CD for International Financial Statistics,a n df r o mH a v e r . Haver is the
source of the data on Taiwan. The nominal and real Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) data primarily are from World Development Indicators. These data
are supplemented by data from International Financial Statistics when these
IFS data are more complete or consistent. 10 We use the data on money plus
quasimoney from IFS except when the WDI data cover a longer period or
have more signiﬁcant digits. 11 The price index is the Gross Domestic Product
deﬂator and nominal income is GDP. Table A1 in the Appendix lists all the
countries and the periods over which we have GDP and money data.
Data for some individual countries are from Haver or country-speciﬁcs o u r c e s .
Data for Taiwan are from Haver because these data are not available in either
WDI or IFS.
Inspection of some series suggested discontinuities in the underlying data from
WDI and IFS. As it turned out, all of the issues concerned the nominal quan-
tity of money. When collecting data from an individual central bank’s website,
we collected the monetary series emphasized by the central bank. The nomi-
nal quanity of money for Belgium is M3 from the National Bank of Belgium’s
website. The quantity of money for Canada is M2 from Haver. The quantity
of money for Japan is M2 including certiﬁcates of deposit from the Bank of
Japan’s website. Earlier and later series are spliced by the average monthly
ratio of 0.995519 in the overlapping period April 1998 to March 1999. The
quantity of money for New Zealand is M3 from the Bank of New Zealand.
The growth rate of the nominal quantity of money for Macedonia is M2 from
the Central Bank. The nominal quantity of money for the United Kingdom
is M4 from the Bank of England. All data for the United States are from
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s website and the nominal quantity of
money is M2.
The long-term data for Brazil and Chile are from Rolnick and Weber (1997)
10 W eu s es o m eo ra l lIFS data for Anguilla, Aruba, Barbados, Cambodia, Cape
Verde, Fiji, Kuwait, Libya, the Maldives, Montserrat, Qatar and San Marino.
11 The WDI data available to us often contain more signiﬁcant digits when there are
large changes in the quantity of money. We use WDI data for Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Guinea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Malta, Nicaragua, Peru,
Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Slovenia, Sudan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda,
Uruguay and Zimbabwe.
19updated by World Development Indicators. 12 The monetary variable from
Rolnick and Weber’s data is their M2. The data are updated by spliced data
from the World Development Indicators for 1986 through 2006.
12 Rolnick and Weber (1995) provide the data sources in their Data Appendix. We
thank Warren Weber for providing the data.
20A n d e r s o n ,L .C . ,J o r d a n ,J .L .1 9 6 8 .M o n e t a r ya n dF i s c a lA c t i o n s :AT e s to f
Their Relative Importance in Economic Stabilization. Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis Review 50 (11), 11-24.
De Grauwe, P., Polan, M. 2005. Is Inﬂation Always and Everywhere a Mone-
tary Phenomenon? Scandinavian Journal of Economics 107 (2), 239-59.
D w y e r ,J r . ,G .P . ,H a f e r ,R .W .1 9 9 9 .A r eI n ﬂation and Money Growth Still
Related? Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review 84 (2), 32-43.
Dwyer, Jr., G. P., Hafer, R. W. 1988. Is Money Irrelevant? Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis Review 70 (3), 1-17.
Estrella, A., Mishkin, F. S. 1997. Is There a Role for Monetary Aggregates
in the Conduct of Monetary Policy? Journal of Monetary Economics 40 (2),
279-304.
Frain, J. Inﬂation and Money Growth: Evidence from a Multi-Country Data-
set. Economic and Social Review 35 (3), 251-66.
Friedman, M. 1956. Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
Kishor, N. K., Kochin, L. A. 2007. The Success of the Fed and the Death of
Monetarism. Economic Inquiry 45(1), 56-70.
Koop, G. 2003. Bayesian Econometrics. Chichester, England: John Wiley &
Sons Ltd.
Lothian, J. R. 1985. Equilibrium Relationships between Money and Other
Economic Variables. American Economic Review 75 (4), 828-35.
Lothian, J. R. 1976. The Demand for High-Powered Money. American Eco-
nomic Review 66 (1), 56-68.
Lothian, J. R., McCarthy, C. 2009. The Behavior of Money and Other Eco-
nomic Variables: Two Natural Experiments. Journal of International Money
and Finance, this issue.
Lucas, Jr., R. E. 1980. Two Illustrations of the Quantity Theory of Money.
American Economic Review 70 (5), 1005-14.
M c C a n d l e s s ,J r . ,G .T . ,W e b e r ,W .E .1 9 9 5 .S o m eM o n e t a r yF a c t s .F e d e r a l
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 19 (3), 2-11.
Moroney, J. R. 2002. Money Growth, Output Growth and Inﬂation: Esti-
mation of a Modern Quantity Theory. Southern Economic Journal 69 (4),
21398-413.
R o l n i c k ,A .J . ,W e b e r ,W .E .1 9 9 5 .M o n e y ,I n ﬂation and Output Under Al-
ternative Monetary Standards. Staﬀ Report 175, Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis.
R o l n i c k ,A .J . ,W e b e r ,W .E .1 9 9 7 .M o n e y ,I n ﬂation and Output under Fiat
and Commodity Standards. Journal of Political Economy 105 (6), 1308-21.
22Figure 1















































Money relative to real income











Chile 1940 to 2006Figure 2























































Money relative to real income
United States 1959 to 2007Figure 3
Inflation and Excess Money Growth for Lower Growth Rates of Excess Money
Note: The slope indicated in the figure is the slope of the regression line. The solid line in the









slope         1.006







Excess money growth less than 50 percent
correlation  0.951
slope          0.992







Excess money growth less than 20 percent
correlation 0.853
slope         0.883





Excess money growth less than 10 percent
correlation  0.465
slope          0.411





























Inflation and Excess Money Growth over Shorter Time Periods
Note: The slope indicated in the figure is the slope of the regression line. The solid line in the
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eFigure 5. Posterior means and 90% highest posterior density regions for





1.0Figure 6. Scatterplots of ½is versus ¯i for s 2 f1;3;5g. The sample



















































n = 166 and s = 1
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119 Countries with T ³ 20Table 1
Countries and Years
Country First Year Last Year Country First Year Last Year
Albania 1994 2006 Brazil 1985 2006
Algeria 1985 2006 Bulgaria 1991 2006
Anguilla 1990 2005 Burkina Faso 1985 2006
Antigua and
Barbuda
1985 2006 Burundi 1985 2006
Argentina 1985 2006 Cambodia 1993 2006
Armenia 1992 2006 Cameroon 1985 2006
Aruba 1991 2004 Canada 1985 2006
Australia 1985 2006 Cape Verde 1985 2006
Austria 1985 1997 Central African
Republic
1985 2006
Azerbaijan 1992 2006 Chad 1985 2006
Bahamas, The 1985 2002 Chile 1985 2006
Bahrain 1985 2005 China 1985 2006
Bangladesh 1985 2006 Colombia 1990 2006
Barbados 1985 2004 Comoros 1985 2006
Belarus 1994 2006 Costa Rica 1985 2006
Belgium 1985 1998 Cote d'Ivoire 1985 2006
Belize 1985 2006 Croatia 1993 2006
Benin 1985 2006 Cyprus 1985 2006
Bhutan 1985 2006 Czech Republic 1993 2006
Bolivia 1985 2006 Denmark 1985 2006
Botswana 1985 2006 Djibouti 1990 2006
Dominica 1985 2006 Haiti 1985 2006
Dominican Republic 1985 2006 Honduras 1985 2006
Ecuador 1985 2006 Hong Kong 1991 2006
Egypt 1985 2006 Hungary 1985 2006
El Salvador 1985 2006 Iceland 1985 2006
Equatorial Guinea 1985 2006 India 1985 2006
Estonia 1991 2006 Indonesia 1985 2006Country First Year Last Year Country First Year Last Year
Ethiopia 1985 2006 Iran 1986 2006
Euro Area 1995 2007 Israel 1985 2006
Fiji 1985 2006 Italy 1985 1997
Finland 1985 1997 Jamaica 1985 2006
France 1985 1997 Japan 1985 2006
Gabon 1985 2006 Jordan 1985 2006
Gambia, The 1985 2006 Kazakhstan 1993 2006
Germany 1985 1997 Kenya 1985 2006
Ghana 1985 2006 Kuwait 1992 2006
Grenada 1985 2006 Laos 1987 2006
Guatemala 1985 2006 Latvia 1993 2006
Guinea 1989 2005 Lebanon 1988 2006
Guinea-Bissau 1986 2006 Lesotho 1985 2006
Guyana 1985 2006 Liberia 1991 2006
Libya 1985 2006 Netherlands 1985 1997
Lithuania 1993 2006 New Zealand 1985 2006
Macao 1985 2006 Nicaragua 1985 2006
Macedonia 1992 2006 Niger 1985 2006
Madagascar 1985 2006 Nigeria 1985 2005
Malawi 1985 2006 Norway 1985 2003
Malaysia 1985 2006 Oman 1985 2005
Maldives 1985 2006 Pakistan 1985 2006
Mali 1985 2006 Panama 1985 2006
Malta 1985 2006 Papua New Guinea 1985 2006
Mauritania 1985 2003 Paraguay 1985 2006
Mauritius 1985 2006 Peru 1985 2006
Mexico 1985 2006 Philippines 1985 2006
Moldova 1991 2006 Poland 1990 2006
Mongolia 1991 2006 Portugal 1985 1997Country First Year Last Year Country First Year Last Year
Montserrat 1985 2005 Qatar 1985 2006
Morocco 1985 2006 Republic of the
Congo
1985 2006
Mozambique 1988 2006 Romania 1985 2006
Myanmar 1985 2005 Russia 1993 2006
Namibia 1990 2006 Rwanda 1985 2005
Nepal 1985 2006 Saint Kitts and
Nevis
1985 2006
Saint Lucia 1985 2006 Taiwan 1985 2007
Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines
1985 2005 Tanzania 1988 2006
Samoa 1985 2006 Thailand 1985 2006
Saudi Arabia 1985 2006 Togo 1985 2006
Senegal 1985 2006 Tonga 1985 2006
Seychelles 1985 2006 Trinidad and
Tobago
1985 2006
Sierra Leone 1985 2006 Tunisia 1985 2006
Singapore 1985 2006 Turkey 1985 2006
Slovakia 1993 2006 Uganda 1985 2006
Slovenia 1991 2006 Ukraine 1992 2006
Solomon Islands 1985 2006 United Arab
Emirates
1985 2005
South Africa 1985 2006 United Kingdom 1985 2006
South Korea 1985 2006 United States 1985 2006
Spain 1985 1997 Uruguay 1985 2006
Sri Lanka 1985 2005 Vanuatu 1985 2006
Sudan 1985 2006 Venezuela 1985 2006
Suriname 1985 2006 Yemen 1990 2006
Swaziland 1985 2006 Zambia 1993 2006
Sweden 1985 2006 Zimbabwe 1985 2005
Switzerland 1985 2006
Syria 1985 2006